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Abstract
According to the decomposition thesis, perceptual experiences resolve without 
remainder into their different modality-specific components. Contrary to this view, 
I argue that certain cases of multisensory integration give rise to experiences rep-
resenting features of a novel type. Through the coordinated use of bodily aware-
ness—understood here as encompassing both proprioception and kinaesthesis—and 
the exteroceptive sensory modalities, one becomes perceptually responsive to spatial 
features whose instances couldn’t be represented by any of the contributing modali-
ties functioning in isolation. I develop an argument for this conclusion focusing on 
two cases: 3D shape perception in haptic touch and experiencing an object’s egocen-
tric location in crossmodally accessible, environmental space.
Keywords Multisensory perception · Proprioception · Kinaesthesis · Egocentric 
space · Haptic touch · Crossmodal perception
1 Introduction
The term “multisensory integration”, I have elsewhere suggested (Briscoe 2016, 
2017), is used in both philosophical and scientific literature to refer to two com-
putationally distinct processes:  optimizing multisensory integration (O-integration 
for short) and what I shall refer to as non-optimizing or “generative” multisensory 
integration (G-integration for short). In what follows, I begin by examining the dis-
tinction between these two types of multisensory integration (Sects. 2, 3). Cases of 
G-integration, I’ll then argue, have the potential to provide a strong challenge to a 
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long-standing view in the philosophy of perception that Tim Bayne (2014) dubs 
the “decomposition thesis”. According to this view, perceptual experiences resolve 
without remainder into their modality‐specific components. Consider, for example, 
your overall experience of ringing a doorbell: you see the way your hand is moving; 
you hear the chime; and you feel, among other things, the pressure applied by the 
tip of your finger. If the decomposition thesis is correct, then this is essentially the 
whole story. Your experience can be exhaustively factored into episodes of seeing, 
hearing, touching, that in the relevant instance happen to be co-conscious, but that 
might in other circumstances have occurred without the others. The stream of per-
ceptual consciousness contains parallel, but separate tracks for each of its modalities.
Bayne doesn’t equip us with a definition of modality-specifity, but discussions 
by Casey O’Callaghan (2014, 2015, 2017) are helpful. According to O’Callaghan, 
the thesis that all perceptual experience is modality-specific is best understood as 
the claim that the phenomenal character of any perceptual episode “is exhausted 
by that which, for each of its respective modalities, could be the phenomenal char-
acter of a corresponding mere experience of that modality” plus whatever results 
from simple co-consciousness (2014, p. 151). A mere experience of a modality, in 
turn, is defined as one that “allows prior perceptual experiences of other modalities, 
but requires while it occurs that its subject’s overall perceptual experience remain 
wholly or solely of one modality” (2014, p. 151).
Contrary to the decomposition thesis, I will argue that certain cases of G-inte-
gration give rise to experiences representing features of a novel type—features 
that couldn’t be instantiated by any mere experience of a contributing modality. 
O’Callaghan has recently made a case for this conclusion with respect to flavor per-
ception (Sect.  4). No mere experience of taste, retronasal olfaction, touch, or any 
other modality contributing to the perception of flavor, he suggests, is, for example, 
an experience of mintiness. “There is a distinctive, recognizable, and novel quality 
of mint… that is consciously perceptible only thanks to the joint work of several 
sensory systems” (O’Callaghan 2017, p. 174). I’m going to argue for an analogous 
conclusion in this contribution, focusing on two additional examples. I will argue, 
first, that haptic touch involves a form of G-integration because neither cutaneous 
touch, nor proprioception, nor kinaesthesis operating by itself is a potential source 
of perceptual information about the 3D shapes of objects external to the subject’s 
body (Sect. 5). And I will argue, second, that no mere experience in any modality is 
an experience of an object’s egocentric location in crossmodally accessible, environ-
mental space (Sect. 6).1
1 My arguments for these conclusions are intended to remain neutral with respect to foundational 
debates in the epistemology and metaphysics of perception, including the debate between externalism 
and internalism and between representationalism and relationalism/naïve realism. Thanks to an anony-
mous referee for requesting me to be clear on this point.
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2  Optimizing multisensory integration
The initial estimates of a property produced by different modalities may sometimes 
conflict with one another.  Vision and touch, for example, might produce conflict-
ing initial estimates of an object’s 3D shape or orientation. Alternatively, vision and 
proprioception, might produce different initial estimates of the location at which a 
part of the body is located (Stratton 1899; Harris 1965; Botvinick and Cohen 1998). 
Such intersensory discrepancies can arise for a variety reasons. Initial estimates, for 
example, may conflict due to the noisiness of neural computation (for discussion, 
see Knill and Pouget 2004). Or one modality might simply have a finer spatial or 
temporal grain when it comes to discriminating a type of feature. Vision is generally 
better at answering where questions than audition, while audition is generally better 
at answering when questions than vision.
According to a recently influential Bayesian approach to multisensory perception 
in cognitive science, initial estimates of a property provided by different modalities 
are weighted by their relative reliability and combined in a way that optimizes, i.e., 
reduces the variance in, the final perceptual estimate of that property.2 Since this 
final estimate is a compromise between the different initial estimates, such optimiz-
ing multisensory integration (O-integration) also serves to reduce intersensory dis-
crepancy at the level of conscious perception.
Numerous illusions can be explained as perceptual consequences of O-integra-
tion. In the ventriloquism effect (Bertelson 1999), for example, initial visual and 
auditory estimates of an object’s direction are at odds. Typically, auditory locali-
zation of the object is strongly biased toward the initial visual estimate, and when 
initial estimates are not highly discrepant, the upshot is that the sound you hear non-
veridically appears to be coming from the object you see. This effect is sometimes 
referred to as “phenomenal fusion” (Radeau and Bertelson 1977).
Other well-known illusions exemplifying processes of O-integration include:
The McGurk effect: In this illusion (McGurk and MacDonald 1976), inputs 
from vision influence the contents of auditory experience. When subjects 
watch a video of a speaker articulating the sound /ga/ dubbed with a recording 
of a speaker pronouncing the sound /ba/, they report hearing the sound /da/
instead (a kind of phonological compromise).
Visual capture of touch and proprioception: When initial visual and hap-
tic estimates of an object’s spatial properties, e.g., its shape, size, or orien-
tation, are experimentally set in conflict, the final, conscious haptic estimate 
is strongly biased in the direction of the initial visual estimate (Gibson 1933; 
Rock and Harris 1967). Such visual dominance is also found when visual and 
proprioceptive estimates of the position of a body part are made to conflict 
(Hay et al. 1965; Welch and Warren 1980; Botvinick and Cohen 1998; Samad 
et al. 2015).
2 See Rohde et al. (2016) and the essays collected in Trommershäuser et al. (2011) for useful overviews.
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The parchment skin illusion: To elicit this illusion, experimenters recorded 
the sounds produced while subjects rubbed their palms together (Jousmäki 
and Hari 1998). These sounds were played back to the participants through 
headphones, “dubbing” the tactile stimulation they received. When high fre-
quencies were accentuated, participants reported that their skin felt dry and 
paper-like. Jousmaki and Hari propose that this illusion reflects an “omnipres-
ent intersensory integration phenomenon, which helps the subject to make 
accurate tactile decisions about the roughness and stiffness of different textures 
they manipulate” (R190).
For present purposes, the important point is that in O-integration multiple modali-
ties provide distinct and potentially conflicting, initial estimates of a single prop-
erty—e.g., 3D shape, orientation, or texture—that they jointly attribute to a per-
ceived object or event. The end-product of O-integration is a revised and, when all 
goes well, optimized estimate of that property. Hence, the total number of property 
types represented by different modalities remains the same after O-integration has 
taken place.
This point can be brought out by reflecting on the role of O-integration in the 
ventriloquism effect. In the ventriloquism effect, the apparent location of an 
auditory event can be strongly biased in the direction of a simultaneous visual 
event. Although new auditory information is thus produced by interaction with the 
visual system, it is clearly information that the auditory system could have produced 
on its own in different circumstances (Macpherson 2011b). Analogously, in the 
McGurk effect, neither vision nor audition by itself represents the speaker as pro-
nouncing the sound /da/, but /da/ is obviously a sound that could have been repre-
sented by means of audition alone under other conditions.
3  Generative multisensory integration
In ventriloquism, the McGurk effect, and other cases of O-integration, the infor-
mation produced by multisensory interaction is new only in the sense that it is an 
optimized revision of the initial estimate provided by one or more of the contribut-
ing modalities. Combining estimates of different types of properties across distinct 
modalities, some philosophers have recently argued, however, may give rise to the 
representation of a genuinely novel or “emergent” property, one that couldn’t be rep-
resented by any of the contributing modalities functioning in isolation. In what fol-
lows, I’ll refer to this alternative form of multisensory processing as “generative” 
multisensory integration (or G-integration for short).
Before proceeding, it is necessary to clarify two different ways in which G-inte-
gration could support the representation of a novel type of feature. First, a feature 
F could be novel, but only relative to the representational powers of the specific 
modalities that contribute to the relevant G-integration process. Here, although no 
mere experience of any of the contributing modalities could be an experience as 
of something F, some other, non-contributing modality is capable of representing 
feature F on its own. In this type of case, we can say that F is a feature of a weakly 
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novel multisensory type. 3D shape, I shall argue in Sect. 5, is an example of such a 
feature. 3D shape is novel relative to the representational powers of the modalities 
that contribute to G-integration in haptic touch (cutaneous touch, proprioception, 
and kinaesthesis), but familiar relative to the representational powers of vision.
Alternatively, and more dramatically, G-integrating information from different 
modalities may result in the representation of a feature F that isn’t ever perceptible 
unimodally. If so, then no instance of F could be represented outside the context of 
the relevant G-integration process. To use O’Callaghan’s language, no mere experi-
ence of any modality could be an experience as of something F. In this type of case, 
we can say that F is a feature of a strongly novel multisensory type—a feature only 
revealed through the coordinated use of different senses. Location in crossmodally 
accessible, egocentric space, I shall argue in Sect. 6, is an example of such a feature. 
Location in egocentric space is novel relative to the representational powers of any 
modality working by itself.
It is also important before proceeding to distinguish the claim that G-integration 
can support the representation of weakly novel types of features from the claim that 
certain relational features have instances that are only perceptible multisensorily. 
O’Callaghan (2014, 2015, 2017) discusses cases involving intermodal feature bind-
ing, causation, timing, and meter perception. Importantly, in each of these cases, the 
relevant relational feature is independently perceptible by each of the contributing 
modalities. Consider the case of intermodal meter perception. A study by Huang 
et al. (2012) found that auditory and tactile sequences were coherently grouped by 
musically trained subjects performing a meter recognition task. Meter, however, can 
be perceived by means of either audition or touch alone. Meter isn’t novel relative to 
either of the modalities that contribute to whichever multisensory process is respon-
sible for audio-tactile meter perception. In contrast, a type of feature F is weakly 
novel just in case it has some instances that are perceptible by a single modality, 
but is not independently perceptible by any of the modalities that contribute to the 
relevant G-integration process. F is novel relative to the representational powers of 
those modalities even though F is familiar from other unimodal contexts. The cases 
discussed in the next three sections will hopefully help to clarify this point.
4  Flavor perception
Consider, first, the case of flavor perception. Flavor properties aren’t detected by 
any single set of sensory receptors functioning in isolation: they depend instead on 
the combination of inputs from taste and retronasal olfaction; thermal and somato-
sensory cues; as well as sources of information concerning chemical irritation and 
nociception (for discussion see, Auvray and Spence 2008; Spence et al. 2014; Smith 
2015).
There are at least three influential accounts of flavor perception on the market. 
First, flavors could be strongly novel phenomenal features that are perceptible only 
through the coordinated use of different perceptual modalities. On this view, as 
Smith writes, “we have a category of perceptual quality for which Aristotle’s clas-
sification made no room.  Flavours are not common sensibles accessible by more 
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than one sense; we need many senses—chemical and contact—working together to 
produce flavour perceptions” (2015, p. 320). That is just one possibility. Alterna-
tively, apparent flavors might be better understood as fragmenting into non-struc-
tured collections of gustatory, olfactory, and tactual properties that are referred to a 
single substance in the mouth. On this view, flavor perception doesn’t challenge the 
decomposition thesis. Apparent flavors resolve into a number of unimodally acces-
sible components. Yet a third possibility is that flavor perception isn’t, strictly speak-
ing, multisensory at all. Instead, what we ordinarily refer to as the “sense of taste” 
may just be the flavor system, where the latter utilizes a variety of dedicated trans-
ducer types beyond those found on the tongue. On this view, flavors properties are 
tracked by a single perceptual modality (Auvray and Spence 2008; Matthen 2015).
Casey O’Callaghan (2014, 2015, 2017) makes a persuasive case for the first pos-
sibility: flavor perception, he argues, involves multisensory awareness of a strongly 
novel type of feature, one whose instances are only perceptible through the coor-
dinated operation of distinct senses. “Flavor experiences”, he suggests, “may have 
entirely novel phenomenal features of a type—even a qualitative type—that no 
unimodal experience could instantiate and that do not accrue thanks to simple co-
consciousness” (2015, pp. 567–68, emphasis added). I’m not going to evaluate the 
considerations that O’Callaghan adduces in support of this view. Instead, I’ll argue 
in the next two sections that G-integrating the contents of bodily awareness with 
information derived from exteroceptive modalities may make novel spatial features 
accessible to perceptual consciousness. More specifically, I want to defend two 
proposals.
The first is that experiencing an object’s 3D shape (solid figure) by means of hap-
tic touch involves the G-integration of cutaneous information delivered by receptors 
embedded in the subject’s skin with proprioceptive-kinaesthetic information about 
way her fingers and hand are moving. Haptic touch is a form of G-integration, I 
propose, because neither cutaneous touch, nor proprioception, nor kinaesthesis oper-
ating by itself is a potential source of perceptual information about the 3D shapes 
of nonbodily objects. Since 3D shape is a feature some of whose instances are per-
ceptible by vision alone, however, 3D shape is a weakly novel type of multisensory 
feature: it is novel only relative to the representational powers of cutaneous touch, 
proprioception, and kinaesthesis.3
The second proposal is that no mere experience of any modality is an experience 
of an object’s egocentrically-specified location—that is, its subject-relative distance 
3 An anonymous referee expresses skepticism that “vision on its own suffices for the perception of volu-
minous, 3D shape.” I don’t think that such skepticism is well-motivated. It is true that multiple fixations 
(glances) may be required in some cases to reveal an object’s overt 3D structure and, hence, that proprio-
ceptive-kinaesthetic information about eye movements may sometimes play a role in shape processing. It 
isn’t possible to generalize from this, however, to the conclusion that the perception of 3D shape always 
depends on proprioceptive-kinaesthetic information. Indeed, an opaque object’s shape may be completely 
revealed, I take it, to a passive observer under certain conditions. (Imagine, for example, viewing a cube 
rotating on an axis passing through the cube’s center and two of its vertices.) There is also a large body 
of psychophysical evidence that stimulus-driven mechanisms of amodal completion generate representa-
tions of self-occluded, 3D object structure (Tse 1998, 1999, 2017). For philosophically oriented discus-
sions, see Briscoe (2008, 2011, 2018).
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and direction—in crossmodally accessible, 3D space. More precisely, neither vision, 
nor audition, nor touch, in the absence of contributions from bodily awareness, is 
capable of representing an object’s location in a subject-relative, but non-modality-
specific spatial frame of reference. Since egocentrically-specified location is novel 
relative to the representational powers of any modality operating by itself, egocentri-
cally-specified location is a strongly novel type of multisensory feature.
Before proceeding to the next section, a few remarks are in order. First, I should 
note that I use the term “bodily awareness” here in a way that encompasses both 
proprioception (the sense of how the parts of one’s own body are spatially config-
ured) and kinaesthesis (the sense of bodily movement). Second, I assume that pro-
prioception and kinaesthesis either independently qualify as perceptual modalities or 
together constitute a distinct perceptual modality. There is significant debate about 
the proper criteria for individuating the senses, but candidate perceptual modalities 
Ritchie and Carruthers (2015) plausibly suggest can be evaluated by the degree to 
which they have the following features:
1. Sensitivity to a set or range of related physical properties.
2. Detector mechanisms that transduce these physical properties into an informa-
tional signal to the central nervous system.
3. The evolved function of detecting and representing the physical properties speci-
fied by (1).
4. Representations with nonconceptual content and a mind-to-world direction of fit.
5. Utilization of the informational signals by the organism (typically through inte-
gration with other sensory inputs) to guide intentional action.
Proprioception and kinaesthesis plausibly embody all five of these features and, 
so, constitute fully credentialed perceptual modalities (Fridland 2011; Schwenkler 
2013; de Vignemont 2016). A piece of further support for this view is that there 
exist cases of accurate representation, illusion, and hallucination for proprioception 
and kinaesthesis, just as for the traditional Aristotelian senses (Macpherson 2011a).4 
Some authors subsume proprioception under kinaesthesis (for example, Bastian 
1888, who coined the latter term, and Donaldson 2000), while others subsume kin-
aesthesis under proprioception (Roll et al. 1991; Proske and Gandevia 2012; Gallace 
and Spence 2014; Ritchie and Carruthers 2015). For my purposes here, however, 
it doesn’t matter whether proprioception or kinaesthesis is understood as the more 
encompassing form of bodily awareness or whether they should instead be thought 
of as distinct senses (McCloskey 1973). What matters is that bodily awareness is a 
source of perceptual information that can contribute to both types of multisensory 
integration discussed here.




5  Haptic touch
Haptic touch—also known as active or exploratory touch—is a promising case 
of G-integration. In order to perceive the 3D shape (solid figure) of an object by 
means of haptic touch it is necessary to combine cutaneous information delivered 
by receptors embedded in your skin with kinaesthetic and proprioceptive infor-
mation about specific way your fingers and hand are moving. The same cutaneous 
information when combined with substantially different kinaesthetic and proprio-
ceptive information would result in perceiving the object as filling out space in a 
different way. Haptic touch is a form of multisensory, G-integration, I propose, 
because neither cutaneous touch nor bodily awareness operating by itself is a 
potential source of perceptual information about the 3D shapes of objects exter-
nal to the body. Since 3D shape is perceptible by (normal, fully developed) vision 
operating on its own, however, 3D shape is a weakly novel type of multisensory 
feature. It is only novel relative to the representational powers of cutaneous touch 
and bodily awareness. To use O’Callaghan’s terminology, no mere experience of 
either cutaneous touch, or kinaesthesis, or proprioception could be an experience 
of a nonbodily object as, for example, cuboid, or pyramidal, or teapot-shaped.
This assessment is in keeping with what I take to be the establishment view 
of haptic touch in cognitive science. According to this view, haptic touch, unlike 
passive, cutaneous touch, is not a single, unified, perceptual modality:
It is important to emphasize that active haptic sensing per se constitutes a 
legitimate form of multimodal perception inasmuch as this form of sensing 
uses both tactile and kinesthetic sensory inputs (Jones and Lederman 2006, 
p. 76; quoted by Fulkerson 2014a, b, p. 18).
…[T]actile sensations can be combined with proprioceptive information 
about body configuration to produce a spatial, volumetric description of a 
tactile object…. This may simply be an instance of the general bottom-up 
process of combining sources of information through multisensory percep-
tion (Serino and Haggard 2010, p. 233).
Given that what is commonly referred to as the sense of touch actually 
appears to encompass several distinct sensory systems…, it should perhaps 
be considered more of a multisensory (i.e., derived from the integration of 
different sensory inputs) rather than a single sensory modality (Gallace and 
Spence 2014, p. 5).
The establishment view of haptic touch has been recently challenged by Matthew 
Fulkerson (2014a, b). According to Fulkerson (2014a, b), haptic touch is a single, 
unified sensory modality. In keeping with his sensory pluralism—the view that 
there are different explanatory dimensions along which a perceptual experience 
or system can be categorized as either unisensory or multisensory—this claim is 
relativized to a specific criterion for multisensory awareness:
Multisensory experiences do not involve the direct predication of individual 
features onto perceptual objects.  Instead, there is an [associative relation] 
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between already bound or grouped sets of features….  The senses provide 
structured information about object features, and the diversity of multisensory 
interactions serve to coordinate that information (Fulkerson 2014a, b, p. 36).
In what follows, I shall refer to this necessary condition for multisensory experi-
ence as the association criterion. The association criterion allows for many dif-
ferent types of multisensory interaction and coordination. An associative relation, 
Fulkerson writes, “implies some connection between experiences, without speci-
fying the nature of this connection…. In virtue of such associations, experiences 
may suppress one another, or enhance one another, or one may dominate the 
other, etc., and there is no reason to think that any single mechanism is involved 
in every case of multisensory involvement” (2011, p. 494).
Fulkerson argues that perceiving by haptic touch doesn’t involve an associative 
relation between already bound or grouped sets of perceptual features and, hence, 
that it ought not to be categorized as multisensory in nature. He also defends this 
verdict on independent, phenomenological grounds.  In what follows, I shall make 
the case for an opposing view. In particular, I’ll argue that haptic touch can be prop-
erly characterized as a case of G-integration.
Fulkerson’s main argument against the establishment view is based on the idea 
that haptic touch doesn’t satisfy the association criterion.  “Touch, like vision and 
other major senses”, he writes, “does not involve any associative relation. It involves 
the direct predication or binding of sensory features onto individual objects” (2014a, 
b, p. 40). Fulkerson takes vision, for example, to have the following existential, 
merely property-involving structure:
There is a visual object O, and O has certain features.
The ventriloquism effect, by contrast, would qualify as an example of a genu-
inely multisensory experience, on Fulkerson’s account, because it can be modeled 
as involving an associative relation between two distinct, existentially quantified 
assignments of features to objects (2014a, b, p. 35):
[There is a visible object O, and O has certain features] → [There is a sound S, 
and S has certain features].
The arrow here indicates that the relevant associative relation between vision and 
audition leads to an alteration in the content of the auditory experience (in particu-
lar, a shift in the apparent direction of the sound).
In contrast with the ventriloquism effect and other cases of O-integration, haptic 
touch, Fulkerson proposes, has a non-associative, feature-predicating structure:
There is a haptic object O, and O has certain features.
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I don’t think that this analysis is correct. To perceive a nonbodily thing’s 3D shape 
by means of haptic touch it is typically necessary to represent the changing joint 
configuration of your hand. The relevant proprioceptive-kinaesthetic representa-
tions, it seems clear, directly assign certain spatial features to an object, namely, a 
part of the body. They have their own feature-predicating structure.5 In addition, it 
is also necessary to form cutaneous tactual representations in response to events that 
are taking place on the surface of your hand, for example, changes in pressure or 
temperature. These tactual representations also directly assign certain features to a 
perceived object, whether we identify the latter with the relevant part of your body, 
or the distal thing you are touching, or, as on some accounts, with both.6
Jones and Lederman (2006) review evidence concerning the range of properties 
attributed by cutaneous touch to its objects. Their list includes pressure, tempera-
ture, vibration, motion, texture, compliance, orientation, size, curvature, and weight. 
Importantly, experiences of cutaneous touch also assign certain somatotopic loca-
tions to the objects/events that elicit them. Afferent projections from cutaneous 
receptors to primary somatosensory cortex (SI), as Serino and Haggard write, “pre-
serve the spatial organization of receptors in the skin, so that SI contains an essen-
tially spatial representation of the physical body surface. That is, the physical body 
structures tactile sensation, because the receptor surface covers the physical body” 
(Serino and Haggard 2010, p. 225). Finally, there is a growing body of evidence that 
passive, cutaneous touch represents objects and events in accord with Gestalt group-
ing principles such as proximity, similarity, common fate, good continuation, and 
closure (for a review, see Gallace and Spence 2011). For example, tactual elements 
placed closer together are more likely to be grouped together (Chang et al. 2007), 
and subjects perceptually complete the gaps between two separate sequentially-pre-
sented vibrotactile stimuli when these gaps are filled with “tactile noise” (Kitagawa 
et  al. 2009). These empirical results provide further support for the view that the 
contents of cutaneous touch possess genuine, feature-predicating structure.
According to Fulkerson, cases of multisensory experience involve some sort of 
associative relation between two or more perceptual states, each of which has its 
own feature-predicating structure. But this, I have suggested, is just what we find in 
haptic touch: an association between feature-predication in bodily awareness, on the 
one hand, and feature-predication in cutaneous touch, on the other.
Now, one possible response to what I’ve said so far is that although subpersonal 
haptic processing may depend on an associative relation between distinct, unimodal 
perceptual states with feature-predicating structure—and, so, may qualify as multi-
sensory relative to the association criterion—conscious haptic experience may none-
theless display a unisensory phenomenal character. The unity of haptic touch may be 
6 de Vignemont (2014), following Weber, defend a pressure theory of cutaneous touch. On their account, 
cutaneous touch is the direct perception of a symmetrical relation in which one feels pressure between a 
part of the body and some external object. Hence, cutaneous touch typically assigns features both to the 
object exerting pressing on a region R of the bodily surface and to R at the same time.
5 I’m not going to take a stand here on whether that structure is merely property-involving, as Fulkerson 
suggests, or instead involves elements that function to pick out environment particulars, e.g., “singular 
applications” in the sense of Burge (2010).
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defensible, in other words, relative to a phenomenological criterion for unisensory 
experience.  Fulkerson suggests just this: “Haptic touch… does not seem, at least 
to introspection, to involve an association between separate experiences (with their 
own perceptual objects)…. Instead, one has a unified experience with different con-
stituent elements…” (2014a, b, p. 40).
Consistent with this assessment, Fulkerson maintains that perceptual awareness 
of distal object features normally excludes simultaneous awareness of the state of 
the subject’s body in episodes of haptic touch. “Our typical bodily awareness during 
touch is entirely transparent, hidden in the background while we experience exter-
nal and even distal objects and properties” (2014a, b, p. 103, my emphasis). Con-
sciously accessing bodily information in experiences of haptic touch, he suggests, 
requires a perceptual switch akin to the one that occurs when we alternate between 
different aspects of the Necker Cube.
The analogy with the Necker Cube doesn’t seem introspectively strong, however. 
Contrary to Fulkerson, when we are engaged in haptically exploring an object, we 
are typically aware not only of the object’s own properties, but also of which part of 
our body is in contact with the object and, at least to a limited extent, how that body 
part is moving. Consider the experience of exploring the shape of a dinner plate 
using the tip of your index finger. Perceptual awareness of the plate as circular does 
not seem to exclude perceptual awareness of the way your hand and arm are moving 
as your finger traces over the plate’s rim (for example, whether your hand is moving 
in a clockwise or counter-clockwise direction). Similarly, awareness of a surface’s 
texture in haptic touch does not seem to exclude awareness of how much pressure 
you are exerting. Lightly running the tip of your index finger over a wooden desktop 
results in one experience of exploratory touch. Forcefully moving your finger over 
the desktop results in another saliently different experience. Both experiences reveal 
the surface as smooth, but the phenomenological contrast between the two experi-
ences seems well explained by the difference in the accompanying feelings of pres-
sure (de Vignemont and Massin 2015; see Katz 1925/1989, p. 51).
Considerations like these have motivated many philosophers to maintains that 
haptic touch has a “dual” or “bipolar” phenomenal character (Katz 1925/1989; Gib-
son 1962; Martin 1992; O’Shaughnessy 1995; Bermúdez 1998; Scott 2001; Bro-
gaard 2012; de Vignemont and Massin 2015). Bermúdez writes:
The best description of the phenomenology of touch is that tactile experience 
is always both exteroceptive and proprioceptive. Attention can be directed 
either proprioceptively or exteroceptively, and it can be shifted from one to the 
other, but this should be viewed as an alteration of the balance between focal 
and peripheral awareness. When attention is directed exteroceptively toward 
the spatial properties of an object, the perceiver remains peripherally aware of 
the spatial properties of the relevant limb, and vice versa (1998, pp. 138–39).
A phenomenologically adequate account of the relation between object-directed 
and body-directed experience in haptic touch should not be modeled on the switch 
between different aspects of the Necker Cube, but rather, as Bermúdez suggests, 
on the distinction between focal and peripheral perceptual awareness. That we are 
in most cases more attentive to nonbodily object features when we are engaged in 
 Synthese
1 3
haptic exploration, if this is right, doesn’t mean that bodily awareness is entirely 
transparent or “hidden in the background”. Experiences of haptic touch aren’t, in 
general, phenomenologically unified in the manner suggested by Fulkerson.
Summing up, a strong case can be made for the view that haptic touch qualifies 
as multisensory both relative to the association criterion and on phenomenological 
grounds. Furthermore, haptic touch is plausibly a form of what I am calling G-inte-
gration because no mere experience of either cutaneous touch or bodily awareness 
is a potential source of perceptual information about a nonbodily object’s 3D shape. 
3D shape is a weakly novel type of multisensory feature.
An anonymous reviewer has objected that there is at least one instance of 3D 
shape that can be perceived by means of proprioception alone, namely, the 3D shape 
of the subject’s own body (or the shapes of her bodily parts). So, 3D shape is not 
weakly novel, as I claim it is, relative to the representational powers of bodily aware-
ness and cutaneous touch.
This is an interesting objection, but it is premised on the assumption that pro-
prioception, like vision, is a self-standing source of perceptual information about 
the body’s relatively constant structure and metric properties. This assumption has 
been disputed by a long line of philosophers (O’Shaughnessy 1980, 1995; Gallagher 
2003; de Vignemont 2014, 2018; Wong 2017) and cognitive scientists (Longo and 
Haggard 2010; Longo 2015). Gallagher, for example, writes: “although propriocep-
tion provides a sense of posture and limb position, it does not deliver a sense of 
body shape. If I hold my arm out to the side of my body, I can tell this posture by 
proprioception, but proprioception is not such to tell me that my arm is of cylindri-
cal shape rather than rectangular. I know this from other senses” (2003, p. 61). A 
similar point is made by de Vignemont, in a passage worth quoting at length:
[A] problem with the body senses is that they do not directly carry informa-
tion about the shape of the various parts of the body, their size, and their spa-
tial configuration. For example, the facts that we have two arms, that they are 
cylinder-shaped, that they are of a certain length, and that they are connected 
to the torso on one end and to the hands on the other end, cannot be easily 
derived from the body senses…. Active exploration of each body part by hap-
tic touch seems to fare better and to be more specific. However, this involves 
complex tactile-proprioceptive processing, and that in turn requires taking 
into account the size of the exploratory body parts (e.g. fingers). Hence, the 
scope of information that the body senses directly carry is limited. Yet, infor-
mation such as body metrics is needed in order to locate body parts in space. 
For instance, the arms can be crossed or not with the very same joint angles 
depending on their size and on the width of the shoulders (2014, p. 991).
de Vignemont argues that joint angle information provided by our muscle spin-
dles, joint receptors, and Golgi tendon organs is normally supplemented and struc-
tured by a previously constructed representation of the configuration and metrics 
of the body’s parts—a representation variously referred to in the philosophical 
and scientific literature as the “long-term body image” (O’Shaughnessy 1980), 
the “implicit body model” (Longo and Haggard 2010; Tsakiris 2010; Longo 2015; 
Wong 2017; Tamè et  al. 2019), and the “body map” (de Vignemont 2014, 2018). 
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This stored, relatively stable representation of the subject’s anatomy enriches and 
imposes spatial order on information provided by proprioceptive receptor systems 
(see O’Shaughnessy 1980, chapters 7–8). In particular, it provides information about 
bodily metrics needed for purposes of locating bodily parts in space and performing 
object-directed actions. The important point, relative to the reviewer’s objection, is 
that proprioceptive receptor systems do not on their own provide information about 
the 3D shapes of the body’s parts. Proprioception does not take the measure of bod-
ily shape and size, but rather is structured by a stored representation or model of the 
body’s dimensions.7
I’ll turn now to examining the role of bodily awareness in perceiving the spatial 
layout of the distal environment.
6  The experience of egocentric space
Processes of O-integration are initiated only when there is sufficient evidence that a 
single object (or event) is the causal antecedent of stimulation arriving in different 
modalities. One important source of such evidence, in many contexts (but not all, 
see Spence 2013), is spatial congruence: signals that arrive from a common loca-
tion in space, other things being equal, are more likely to have a common cause than 
those that don’t.
The puzzle, from a neural point of view, is that the senses initially encode spatial 
information using different, body-relative frames of reference (Stein and Meredith 
1993; Driver and Spence 1998a, b; Clark 2011). An object’s location is initially 
encoded in eye-centered (retinocentric) coordinates by vision, head-centered coor-
dinates by audition, and hand-centered, somatotopic coordinates by manual touch. 
The receptor surfaces for different senses, moreover, don’t stand in invariant spatial 
relations to one another: the relative position of your eyes, head, and hands change 
from one moment to the next. How, then, is a stable, crossmodally accessible repre-
sentation of external space that can support O-integration achieved?
The solution to the puzzle involves combining modality-specific sources percep-
tual information about an object’s location with proprioceptive-kinaesthetic infor-
mation about the current spatial configuration of the body. Driver and Spence write:
When taken in isolation, each modality signals stimulus location with respect 
to its own receptor surface only (e.g. on the eye for vision, or on the skin 
for touch). Since the receptors for each modality can move freely relative to 
external objects (as in eye- or hand-movements) and can also move relative 
to each other (as when making an eye-movement but no hand-movement, or 
vice versa), a single modality alone cannot provide a stable representation of 
external space. Instead, this requires integration of information from multiple 
sensory modalities, so that current posture is taken into consideration, as well 
as the location of stimuli on receptor surfaces (Driver and Spence 1998a, p. 
254, emphasis added).
7 See, however, Longo and Haggard (2010, 2011), Longo et al. (2012), and Longo (2014) for evidence 
that this representation is systematically distorted in surprising ways.
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Generating more useful representations of space (e.g., in order to derive stable 
visual position across saccades) requires spatial information to be integrated 
from more than one sense (e.g., retinal position to be combined with extrareti-
nal signals about eye-position). Thus, even when attending to a particular loca-
tion in just the “visual” world, it may be that more than one sense is involved 
in generating a stable representation of that location (Spence and Driver 2004, 
pp. 180–81).
Supporting this proposal, there is a large body of neuroscientific evidence that neu-
rons in posterior parietal cortex compute the subject-relative locations of objects in 
external space by integrating incoming exteroceptive information with sources of 
proprioceptive-kinaesthetic information about relevant bodily effectors (Zipser and 
Andersen 1988; Andersen et  al. 1997; Cohen and Andersen 2004; Azañón et  al. 
2010; for a review, see Whitlock 2017). In the visual case, retinocentric informa-
tion about an object’s location can be combined with extraretinal signals specifying 
eye position in order to generate a representation of the object’s location in a head-
centered reference frame. The relevant computational process is known as coordi-
nate transformation. Importantly, the process of coordinate transformation can be 
iterated by further combining proprioceptive information about the rotation of the 
perceiver’s head and the joint angles of her shoulder, elbow, and wrist to work up a 
representation of the object’s location relative to her torso or hand. Similar computa-
tions are possible for the other exteroceptive modalities.
When combined with sources of proprioceptive information, visual, auditory, and 
tactile signals can thus all be used to represent locations in external space using com-
mon, body-relative reference frames (Bermúdez 1998, chap. 6; Spence and Driver 
2004; Grush 2007; Briscoe 2009; Clark 2011; Wu 2014; Briscoe and Schwenkler 
2015; Tamè et al. 2019). And coordinate transformation thus makes it possible to 
assess whether the sources of signals arriving different modalities are spatially con-
gruent as is often required for purposes of non-generative, optimizing integration 
(Briscoe 2016). For example, combining visual signals with information about eye 
position enables the perceptual system to compute the location of something seen 
relative to the perceiver’s head and, hence, the distance between that location and 
the location of something heard. This, in turn, may lead to the ventriloquizing of the 
latter in the direction of the former.
Because the computations involved in coordinate transformation depend on the 
availability of up-to-date proprioceptive information of various kinds, it is not sur-
prising that illusions of limb movement and movement can result in correspond-
ing illusions of object motion. Roll et al. (1991), for example, found that vibratory 
stimulation of muscles in the neck induces both an illusory sensation of upward 
head movement as well as an experience of upward, apparent motion for a station-
ary, visually fixated target. More strikingly, Lackner and Levine (1978) found that 
when a target light was attached to a subject’s stationary hand and illusory motion of 
the forearm induced by mechanical muscle vibration, the light appeared to displace 
in the direction of illusory motion even though both the target and the subject’s 
eyes remained motionless. “[T]hese findings”, Lackner and Levine write, “provide 
further support for the notion that the computation of visual direction involves the 
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operation of spatial constancy mechanisms that utilize information from retinal, 
oculomotor, and postural sources in assigning the apparent direction of an object in 
relation to the head and body” (1979, p. 282).
Also relevant are studies of perceptual adaptation involving devices that dis-
place, invert, or reverse the retinal image [Welch (1978) and Redding and Wallace 
(1997) offer comprehensive overviews]. Some of the earliest experiments on opti-
cal rearrangement were performed by von Helmholtz (1867/2005), who practiced 
reaching to targets while wearing prisms that displaced the retinal image to the left. 
The initial tendency was to reach too far in the direction of lateral displacement, 
but after numerous trials reaching gradually regained its former level of accuracy. 
Further, Helmholtz discovered that immediately after removing the prisms from his 
eyes errors in were made in the opposite direction, that is, when reaching for a tar-
get, he now moved his hand too far to the right.
The dominant explanation of this after-effect involves the recalibration of propri-
oceptive signals arriving from one or more points of articulation in the body (Strat-
ton 1899; Harris 1965; Welch 1978, chap. 3). After adapting to laterally displac-
ing prisms, outputs from receptors that previously signified deviation of the eyes to 
the left may come to signify that they are pointing straight ahead. Hence, an object 
located somewhere on the plane of the bodily mid-line may visually appear to be 
located to the right. Similar recalibrations and after-effects are possible for propri-
oceptive signals concerning head rotation. For present purposes, the point is that 
work on perceptual adaption provides further evidence that sources of information 
about the configuration and movement of the body play a major role in perceptually 
localizing objects in external space.
A third set of relevant empirical findings concern the skillful deployment of spa-
tial attention. Numerous studies conducted by Jon Driver, Charles Spence, and oth-
ers have found that attending to a region of space in one perceptual modality can 
attract attention to the same region in other modalities (for helpful overviews, see 
Spence 2010; Spence et al. 2014). Hearing a sound on one’s left, for example, can 
enhance the speed and accuracy with which targets subsequently presented in the 
same leftward region of space are discriminated by vision or touch.
Driver and Spence’s studies indicate that the crossmodal links in selective atten-
tion are mediated by representations of cue and target locations within non-modal-
ity-specific frames of reference. What matters, for example, in tactile-visual atten-
tional facilitation isn’t simply whether cutaneous stimulation is delivered to the skin 
on the left or right side of your body (and, so, whether the tactile cue is registered 
by the left or right hemisphere of your brain). What matters rather is whether the 
stimulated region of the bodily surface is located to the left or right of the direction 
of gaze at the time of stimulation, even if that region is not currently visible (Ken-
nett et al. 2002). Parallel points hold with respect to visual-tactile facilitation: when 
you are looking straight ahead with your arms crossed in front of you, a flash on 
the right side of your visual field will advantage tactile discriminations with your 
left hand, which now closer to the light. Austen Clark in an insightful discussion 
comments: “Notice that this ‘closer to’ is a cross-modal relative distance: When a 
subject’s arms are crossed, tactile stimuli on the left hand are now closer to the light 
source than are tactile stimuli on the right hand. This ‘closer to’ cannot be assessed 
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by touch alone or by vision alone; it requires representation of the place of the light 
and the place of the hands in a common space” (2011, p. 386, my emphasis). In 
order to estimate and adaptively respond to the distance between a tactile cue and a 
visual target in a “common” or crossmodally accessible space, attentional systems 
must take into account proprioceptive-kinaesthetic information of various kinds. 
For example, to estimate the distance between a tactile stimulus delivered to the left 
hand and a light displayed to the right of the bodily midline, attentional systems 
must be able to access shoulder and elbow joint angle information. “A third modal-
ity (here proprioception)”, as Driver and Spence write, “can apparently influence the 
attentional interactions between two other modalities” (1998b, p. 1322).
The above findings concern crossmodal links in spatial attention. It is important 
to emphasize, however, that unimodal spatial attention may also in many contexts 
make use of non-modality-specific frames of reference. Attending to a visible loca-
tion need not be attending to a location in the visual field—that is, to a location 
whose azimuth and elevation are represented using retinocentric coordinates. Simi-
larly, attending to the location of a tactile stimulus need not be attending to a soma-
totopic location on the skin. Driver and Grossenbacher (1996), for example, per-
formed a study in which blindfolded subjects were required to discriminate between 
different vibrotactile stimuli presented to one hand, while ignoring concurrent vibro-
tactile distractors on the other hand. Distractor vibrations were found to interfere 
significantly less when subjects’ hands were placed far apart than when placed close 
together, even though the stimuli and distractors were respectively presented to 
exactly the same locations on the bodily surface. This finding suggests that “some 
forms of proprioceptive-tactile integration can take place prior to attentional selec-
tion” (Driver and Grossenbacher 1996, p. 232). In other words, tactual attention can 
be directed to locations that are represented in a frame of reference that isn’t somato-
topic and, so, could potentially be used to also represent the locations of objects that 
are seen or heard. A similar conclusion can be extracted from experimental stud-
ies of the so-called “crossed-hands deficit”, in which a subject’s ability to judge the 
temporal order of tactile stimuli presented to her hands is impaired when her arms 
are crossed (Yamamoto and Kitazawa 2001; Shore and Spence 2002; Heed et  al. 
2012; Azañón et al. 2016).
Studies of patients with unilateral perceptual neglect further back-up the view 
that unimodal spatial attention need not be directed to locations represented using a 
spatial coding system that is proprietary to the sense in question. Whether a neglect 
patient will become aware of a visually or tactually presented stimulus can depend 
not only on the latter’s position in relation to the eye or the surface of the body, 
respectively, but also on the spatial configuration of the patient’s body (Kooistra and 
Heilman 1989; Karnath et  al. 1991; Driver et  al. 1997; Vuilleumier et  al. 1999). 
Summarizing the neuropsychological evidence, Driver and Vuilleumier write:
in neglect patients, the same visual stimulus at a fixed retinal position may be 
neglected or detected depending on the current orbital position of the eye. For 
instance, a left visual field stimulus that was neglected with the head and eyes 
directed forwards may be detected when presented at the same point on the 
retina but with the eyes and/or head turned right. Passively twisting the trunk 
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towards the left, while leaving the eyes and head facing straight ahead, can also 
bring an otherwise neglected left visual field stimulus back into awareness, 
again suggesting that extraretinal factors can influence visual neglect. This is 
a remarkable finding; whether the patient sees a stimulus depends not only on 
the visual information entering the eyes, but on body posture also (2001, p. 46, 
emphasis added).
…these studies demonstrate there is more to the spatial nature of neglect than 
mere primary sensory loss within fixed retinal or somatotopic co-ordinates. 
They imply that neglect can arise at higher levels of spatial representation, 
some of which involve the integration of different sources of spatial informa-
tion… (2001, p. 48).
I have reviewed numerous sources of evidence in support of the view that proprio-
ception and kinaesthesis play a critical role in crossmodal representation of the spa-
tial environment.8 The proposal that I want to consider in the last part of this essay 
is that the kind of adaptive interaction between the senses involved in coordinate 
transformation qualifies as an example of G-integration. More specifically, I will 
argue, focusing on the case of vision, that when we experience an object’s subject-
relative location in crossmodally accessible space, we have an experience that rep-
resents a strongly novel type of perceptible feature—a feature that is only accessible 
multisensorily.
Before proceeding, it may avoid confusion to distinguish the problem of visual 
direction perception (VDP) from the problem of visual space constancy (VSC). The 
problem of VDP is the problem of perceptually estimating an object’s egocentric 
direction, that is, its direction in space in relation to the observer (MacKay 1973; 
Swanston et al. 1987). An adequate solution to the problem of VDP must specify, 
among other things, the bodily frame of reference relative to which direction is per-
ceived as well as which sources of information are necessary to compute an object’s 
egocentric direction. For example, to compute direction in head-centered coordi-
nates, as already mentioned, two variables require values: the perceptual system 
needs an estimate of the object’s location in an eye-based or retinocentric frame of 
reference and, in addition, an estimate of the position of the eye in its orbit. Over a 
century of work on VDP suggests that there are two main sources of information 
about eye-position: afferent or “inflowing” signals from receptors in the six extraoc-
ular muscles and, as von Helmholtz (1867/2005) was one of the first to propose, 
efferent or “outflowing” information concerning the saccade command signal from 
the oculomotor system.9
Other bodily frame of reference for VDP are possible. Peacocke (1992, 2002), 
for example, maintains that visual experiences represent the way visible surfaces are 
arrayed in three-dimensional space relative to a point placed in the subject’s torso. 
8 For other empirical findings that support this conclusion, see Howard and Templeton (1966), Berthoz 
(2000), Lackner and DiZio (2005), and Taylor et al. (2017).
9 See Donaldson (2000) and Bridgeman (2010) for historically oriented reviews of psychological work 
on VDP. See Husserl (1907/1997) for an interesting and rich philosophical discussion of the role of kin-
aesthesis in visual space perception as well as Hatfield (1990), Gallagher (2005), Schwenkler (2014), 
Briscoe (2014), and Briscoe and Grush (2017) for further philosophical assessments.
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“The appropriate set of labeled axes”, he writes, “captures distinctions in the phe-
nomenology of experience itself. Looking straight ahead at Buckingham Palace is 
one experience. It is another to look at the palace with one’s face still toward it but 
with one’s body turned toward a point on the right. In this second case the palace is 
experienced as being off to one side from the direction of straight ahead, even if the 
view remains exactly the same as in the first case” (1992, p. 62). The visual system, 
however, initially encodes an object’s location relative to the eye, that is, in retino-
centric coordinates. Representing an object’s location in visual experience relative to 
the torso thus presupposes prior integration of visual information about the object’s 
eye-relative location with proprioceptive information about the direction of gaze and 
the orientation of the head.
The problem of visual space constancy (VSC), by contrast, concerns the experi-
enced stability of the visual world across eye-movements. When we execute a sac-
cade, the image of the world projected on the retina displaces in the direction of 
eye rotation, yet objects in front of us do not appear to move. A recent treatment by 
Wayne Wu offers a nice characterization of the phenomenon: “Eye movements… 
generate massive changes in the position of objects relative to the direction of gaze 
and the foveal and fixation point positions that define it. Yet despite saccadic eye 
movement, the world remains spatially stable. How then do we represent spatial 
constancy?” (2014, p. 393). The problem of VSC concerns which sources of infor-
mation support such experienced stability, how they are used, and the identification 
of supporting brain areas.
Two points are worth emphasizing. First, the problem of VDP has explanatory 
priority relative to the problem of VSC. Indeed, if VSC is the experience of con-
stancy with respect to an object’s egocentric location—“the spatial constancy that 
we experience every time the eye moves”, Wu writes, “is the spatial constancy of 
objects relative to us, say relative to our head, torso or another otherwise immobile 
body part” (2014, p. 394)—then even to coherently formulate the problem of VSC 
we first need to understand what it is to experience an object’s egocentric location. 
Second, work in vision science suggests that the problem of VDP and the problem 
of VSC may have rather different solutions. In particular, there is on-going debate 
concerning whether the visual system needs to compensate for retinal image motion 
and maintain VSC by taking proprioceptive/kinaesthetic information about eye-posi-
tion into account.10
To prevent misunderstanding, I am not dealing with the problem of VSC in what 
follows. For my purposes, it is the problem of VDP that matters, and there is good 
evidence that VDP is enabled by the coordinated use of vision, proprioception, and 
kinaesthesis.
Now, it may be conceded that subpersonal processes of coordinate transforma-
tion enable representation of an object’s egocentric location within one or another 
10 “The role of efference copy and of extraretinal signals generally…,” Bridgeman suggests, “appears to 
be to inform the brain about static eye position during visual fixation, the time between saccades when 
the retina is transducing the visual world reliably. It does not support space constancy” (2010, p. 105). 
For other assessments, see Bridgeman et al. (1994), Deubel (2004), and Wurtz (2017).
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non-modality-specific spatial frame of reference. It may also be conceded that 
processes of coordinate transformation generate strongly novel perceptual rep-
resentational contents: neither vision, nor proprioception, nor kinaesthesis is by 
itself capable of representing an object as occupying, for example, a certain head 
or torso relative location in surrounding space. Nonetheless, it may be denied that 
perceptual awareness of an object’s location has content that goes beyond the 
contents associated with each of the modalities contributing to the coordinate 
transformation process. In general, claims about multisensory interaction at the 
subpersonal, information-processing level do not straightforwardly entail claims 
about theoretically interesting forms of multisensory experience (Deroy et  al. 
2014; Macpherson 2011b; Mudrik et  al. 2014; O’Callaghan 2008). Our aware-
ness of a visible object O’s subject-relative location in space, phenomenologi-
cally speaking, may decompose into awareness of O’s retinocentric position plus 
co-conscious awareness of the eye’s position in its orbit and/or the head’s orienta-
tion relative to the torso. If so, O’s location relative to part(s) of the body other 
than the eye may be inferred rather than consciously perceptible, and our experi-
ence of O wouldn’t possess any novel content. Call this view decompositionalism 
about VDP.
There are at least three lines of response here. To begin with, decompositional-
ism about VDP isn’t phenomenologically well-motivated. The locations of which 
we seem most directly and non-inferentially to be perceptually aware aren’t loca-
tions represented in multiple, distinct, modality-specific frames of reference,  but 
rather locations in a single, crossmodally accessible system of places and distances 
(Evans 1982; Bermúdez 1998, chap. 6; Driver and Spence 1998a; Kaplan 2007; 
O’Callaghan 2008; Clark 2011; Bayne 2014; Matthen 2014, 2017; Nudds 2014). 
For example, we may be aware that something we hear is above us and to the left 
and, at the same time, that something we see is down and to the right, across many 
different changes in eye-position and bodily posture.  Such awareness presupposes 
the ability to keep track of where objects are located around the body using one or 
more non-modality-specific spatial frames of reference.
According to the decompositionalist, the experience of VDP comprises two intro-
spectively distinguishable, modality-specific components: awareness of the per-
ceived object’s position in an eye-centered frame of reference, and, in addition, co-
conscious awareness of the eye’s position relative to the head. Even if we are able 
introspectively to distinguish between these two experiential components—and this 
is my second response to the objection—the experience of VDP could still involve 
awareness of an additional, non-modality-specific component.
Consider by way of analogy the so-called “duality” or “bipolarity” of hap-
tic touch. Experiences of haptic touch have a bipolar phenomenology and content 
because, when you are engaged in haptically exploring an object, it is possible to 
attend to the object’s tangible properties and, at the same time, to how the con-
figuration of the relevant part(s) of your body is changing. One way this could be 
true would be if, as I argued in the previous section, experiences of haptic touch 
involve both modality-specific cutaneous tactual, proprioceptive, and kinaesthetic 
content as well as non-modality-specific object-representing content. Experiences 
of haptic touch, I proposed, do not resolve into their modality-specific components, 
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but, in addition, make weakly novel multisensory features accessible to perceptual 
consciousness.
This view contrasts with a decompositionalist account of the relation between 
haptic touch perception and bodily awareness that Fulkerson (2014a) dubs Consti-
tution Tactual Bodily Dependence (Constitution-TBD). According to Constitution-
TBD, experiences of haptic touch are just complex sets of concurrent propriocep-
tive, kinaesthetic, and cutaneous tactual experiences. Object-directed contents in 
haptic touch, in other words, are constituted or defined by bodily contents. Consti-
tution-TBD confronts a battery of objections (Scott 2001; de Vignemont and Mas-
sin 2015; Richardson 2013). Here I discuss two. First, when we haptically explore 
an object, we may be focally aware of the object’s tangible properties and only 
peripherally aware of the bodily experiences that result from our exploration (Ber-
múdez 1998, chap. 6). This, however, seems inconsistent with the claim that expe-
riences of haptic touch are fully constituted by their modality-specific propriocep-
tive, kinaesthetic, and cutaneous components: were this the case, focally attending to 
the object’s shape or texture, for example, would amount to focally attending to the 
relevant complex of bodily experiences or aspects thereof. A second problem with 
Constitution-TBD is that many introspectively different sets of bodily experiences 
can accompany representation of the same tangible property. Fulkerson writes:
I can… feel a surface as hard by pressing it with my thumb, or forefinger, or 
forehead, or toes, or back, and so forth. Each of these is an entirely different 
state of bodily awareness (with distinct contents), but all assign the same prop-
erty, hardness, to the surface. It does not seem likely that externally directed 
touch just is a specific set of bodily experiences. While bodily contents are 
required, they are a diverse and disjointed lot rather than contents that partly 
constitute or define external contents. Consider, what is the associated general 
bodily content that defines feeling something as squishy? Or slimy? Or elastic? 
It seems entirely plausible that we can experience an object as squishy in many 
ways through touch, and certainly not through a precise, well-defined bodily 
content…. The problem isn’t that we have no conception of what our bodies 
feel like when we touch something slimy; it’s that such feelings do not con-
stitute what it is for something to be [experienced as] slimy (2014a, p. 85; see 
also Scott 2001, pp. 153–154).11
Something analogous is plausibly true of haptic shape perception. Numerous, signif-
icantly different combinations of proprioceptive, kinaesthetic, and cutaneous tactual 
input are capable of revealing the 3D shape of a coffee mug, which shape is expe-
rienced as constant and distinct from the contributions made by those modalities 
to perceptual consciousness. There is non-modality-specific perceptual constancy or 
11 David Katz, in The World of Touch (1925/1989), poses a similar anti-decompositionalist objection 
with respect to the role of kinaesthesis in texture discrimination: “Make a movement over your desk pad, 
and feel its quality of ‘soft roughness.’ This impression builds up during the movement, without having 
even the slightest trace of movement as a component in itself…. To be sure, one subjectively experiences 
the movement of the touch organ when it seizes upon the texture of a surface, but the movement does not 
thereby become a component of the surface touch” (Katz 1925/1989, p. 80, emphasis added).
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“objectification” in haptic touch (Burge 2010, p. 399) across introspectively salient 
variation in the contents of bodily awareness. Experiences of 3D shape by means of 
haptic touch are characteristically accompanied by experiences of proprioception, 
kinaesthesis, and cutaneous touch, but don’t seem to decompose into them.12
Also consider again, in this connection, the case of flavor perception. 
O’Callaghan writes:
…while it incorporates such features, apparent flavor may be more than just an 
agglomeration of gustatory, olfactory, and tactual qualities that are attributed 
to something in the mouth. If flavors are not just undifferentiated mixtures or 
unstructured collections of features, then they may involve novel or emergent 
features of a type that cannot be perceived unimodally. For instance, apparent 
flavor could involve a structure (qualitative or temporal) among its sense-spe-
cific components, an organic unity involving them, or an additional qualitative 
component beyond its modality-specific features (2015, pp. 567–568).
The relevant point is that the following two claims could both be true: (1) flavor per-
ception includes various modality-specific components to which we can separately 
attend (even if such attending may be challenging—see Smith 2015), and (2) fla-
vor perception involves a structural or qualitative component that goes beyond those 
modality-specific components. The proposal that apparent flavor is strongly novel 
feature is consistent with the fact that flavors have a complex structure and that we 
can differentially attend to their components.
Something analogous plausibly holds, I would now suggest, when it comes to 
experiencing a visible object’s location (VDP). You can attend, if you make the 
appropriate effort, to the object’s unchanging direction from you even as you attend 
to the object’s changing location in your visual field or to proprioceptive feelings 
accompanying changes in your direction of gaze (or the orientation of your head). 
That you can introspectively distinguish between the modality-specific components 
involved in the experience of VDP doesn’t mean that VDP factors without remain-
der into those components. Experiences of VDP may depend inter alia on sources of 
information provided by proprioception and kinaesthesis without being fully consti-
tuted or defined by the contributions of these systems to perceptual consciousness.
Finally, decompositionalism about VDP comes at a steep price. According to 
decompositionalism, subpersonal processes of coordinate transformation may gener-
ate non-modality-specific representations of the way objects are positioned around 
us in surrounding space, but personal-level awareness of space is always modal-
ity specific. Coordinate transformation processes, however, not only support the 
representation of subject-relative position, they also support the representation of 
subject-relative movement. Consider an observer viewing a luminous target in an 
otherwise dark room. Displacement of the target’s retinal image—say, from the left 
to the right of the direction of gaze—could be caused in at least two different ways. 
12 Compare Thomas Reid’s denial in his Inquiry that our perceptual conceptions of tangible properties 
like hardness and extension resolve into the proprioceptive, kinaesthetic, and tactual sensations elicited 
in us when we touch them. For a valuable discussion, see Buras (2015).
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In one situation, the target is stationary, but the observer’s eyes have saccaded to a 
point left of the target. In the other, the observer’s eyes are stationary, but the object 
has moved to the right. In order to distinguish perceptually between these two situ-
ations, proprioceptive-kinaesthetic information needs to be taken into account. To 
use the language of Bayesian psychology, the observer will experience the object as 
moving only when this “hypothesis” is made sufficiently probable by both the avail-
able visual evidence (left to right displacement of the object’s retinal image) and 
proprioceptive evidence (extra-retinal signals concerning the change in eye position) 
available to her perceptual system. The available visual evidence, by itself, underde-
termines which of the two situations obtains.13
In the type of case just described, proprioceptive-kinaesthetic information is 
utilized to interpret (disambiguate) the displacement of an object’s retinal image. 
Displacement of an object’s retinal image, however, isn’t necessary to perceive the 
object as in motion. As mentioned above, experiments by Roll et  al. (1991) have 
found that experimentally-induced illusions of head or limb movement can trigger 
corresponding illusions of movement for visually fixated targets. Or consider every-
day experiences of visually tracking a moving object, for example, a bird in flight, 
using smooth pursuit eye movements. As Bridgeman and co-authors note, smooth 
pursuit tracking “reverses the movement conditions on the retina: the tracked object 
sweeps across the retina very little, while the background undergoes a brisk motion” 
(1994, p. 255). Nonetheless, it is the tracked object that appears to be in motion 
while the environment appears to be stationary. Furman and Gur (2012) refer to this 
as “pursuit compensation”.
There is strong empirical support for the view that sources of proprioceptive-
kinaesthetic information play an important role in pursuit compensation. In par-
ticular, brain-imaging and electrophysiological studies indicate that (1) the visual 
brain compensates for pursuit-induced retinal motion by means of efference-based 
information about eye movement and (2) that it encodes the changing position of 
the tracked object in head-centered coordinates (for a review, see Furman and Gur 
2012). Neuropsychological findings relevantly indicate that failure to integrate 
efference-based information about eye movement leads to a breakdown in perceived 
background stability when engaged in smooth pursuit (Haarmeier et al. 1997; Fis-
cher et al. 2012; for philosophical discussion, see Wu 2014).
According to decompositionalism about VDP, our experience of an object’s ego-
centrically specified position resolves into visual awareness of the object’s retinocen-
tric position plus co-conscious proprioceptive-kinaesthetic awareness of the spatial 
configuration of the body, in particular, the eye’s changing position in its orbit. We 
are now in a position to see a further problem with this view beyond those already 
indicated: decompositionalism about VDP entails a similarly reductive claim about 
the experience of subject-relative motion. If the experience of visual direction for 
a stationary object O factors without remainder into an experience of O’s position 
13 Sources of proprioceptive-kinaesthetic information perform an analogously important function in spa-
tial vision when both the eyes and head are moving, for example, during exercise of the vestibulo-ocular 
reflex (VOR). See Fetter (2007) and Medendorp (2011) for discussion.
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in a retinocentric frame of reference plus co-conscious proprioceptive-kinaesthetic 
experiences of bodily configuration, then the same should be true of the experience 
of visual direction when O is moving relative to the observer. After all, to experi-
ence an object as moving, say, from your left to your right, just is to experience 
its egocentric direction as undergoing a certain kind of change. Thus, when track-
ing a moving target by means of smooth pursuit, decompositionalism entails that 
your experience resolves into an experience of the target’s stable position in your 
visual field plus co-conscious proprioceptive-kinaesthetic awareness of your chang-
ing direction of gaze. You may infer from these experiences that the target is moving 
along a certain path through space, but, in notable contrast, for example, with the 
target’s color or shape or size, the target’s motion is not a feature that, strictly speak-
ing, is present in the content of your experience.
This, to put it gently, is counterintuitive. There has been long-standing debate 
between restrictivist and expansionist accounts of the admissible contents of vis-
ual experience (Prinz 2006; Siegel 2010; Briscoe 2015; Siegel and Byrne 2016). 
Restrictivists typically deny that high-level kinds such as tiger, pine tree, or alarm 
clock are represented in the phenomenal contents of visual experience. But not even 
the most austere of restrictivists would deny, I presume, that we are perceptually 
aware of an object’s subject-relative motion in the case just described. On the con-
trary, subject-relative motion, like shape, color, and size, is typically taken to figure 
among the commonly admissible “low-level” contents of visual experience. Decom-
positionalism about VDP, in short, comes at the cost of an overly spare inventory of 
the range of spatial features represented in perceptual awareness.14
7  Conclusion
I began above by distinguishing between optimizing and generative forms of multi-
sensory integration. Contrary to the decomposition thesis, I then argued that genera-
tive multisensory integration (G-integration) can give rise to perceptual experiences 
representing spatial features of a novel type, features whose instances couldn’t be 
represented by any of the contributing modalities functioning in isolation. More spe-
cifically, I defended two proposals. First, I argued that the representation of solid, 
3D shape in haptic touch is a form of G-integration because no mere experience of 
cutaneous touch, kinaesthesis, or proprioception could be an experience of a non-
bodily object as, for example, cuboid, or pyramidal, or teapot-shaped. Since solid 
shape is unimodally accessible to vision, however, solid shape is a weakly novel 
type of multisensory feature: it is novel only relative to the representational pow-
ers of cutaneous touch, proprioception, and kinaesthesis. Second, I argued that no 
mere experience of any modality is an experience of an object’s subject-relative 
14 The structure of my argument here closely mirrors the structure of one of O’Callaghan’s (2017) argu-
ments for intermodal apparent motion. I have focused in this section on the experience of object motion 
relative to a stationary subject. See Schwenkler (2014) for an argument that self-motion relative to a sta-
tionary object or 3D scene also figures among the admissible contents of visual experience.
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location in crossmodally accessible, 3D space. More precisely, neither vision, nor 
audition, nor touch, in the absence of contributions from proprioception and kin-
aesthesis, is capable of representing an object’s location in a non-modality-specific, 
egocentric frame of reference. As Roll and Roll (1991) nicely put it, bodily aware-
ness is the “link between body space and extra-personal space”. Since egocentric 
location is novel relative to the representational powers of any modality operating by 
itself, egocentric location, I have proposed, is a strongly novel type of multisensory 
feature.15
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